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Abstract—This paper examines the impact of the combined U.S. state and
federal mortgage interest deduction (MID) on homeownership attainment,
using data from 1984 to 2007 and exploiting variation in the subsidy aris-
ing from changes in the MID within and across states over time. We test
whether capitalization of the MID into house prices offsets the positive
effect on homeownership. We find that the MID boosts homeownership
attainment only of higher-income households in less tightly regulated
housing markets. In more restrictive places, an adverse effect exists. The
MID is an ineffective policy to promote homeownership and improve
social welfare.
I. Introduction
ONE of the largest tax expenditures in the UnitedStates, under federal law and some state law, is the
mortgage interest deduction (MID). It is justified as a means
to broaden access to homeownership. There is some evi-
dence, particularly from urban areas, that homeownership
has important externalities. Hilber and Mayer (2009) find,
however, that the positive externalities of homeownership
may be confined to places with an inelastic supply of hous-
ing. A large literature suggests that in densely populated
areas, homeownership is associated with lower crime rates,
higher voting rates, more participation in collective action,
and other benefits.1 Much earlier work has investigated the
impact of the MID on national homeownership rates, but to
the best of our knowledge, no study to date has sorted out
the extent to which the MID impacts may vary depending
on local housing supply conditions. Since the externalities
appear to depend on location, it is appropriate to consider
how the benefits depend on location. This is the main objec-
tive of this paper.
Using a measure of restrictions on new housing devel-
oped for 83 metropolitan areas in the United States (Saks,
2008), we investigate how local housing market conditions
and income status affect the way the MID influences house-
hold homeownership decisions. Our priors are that the
impact of the MID may be positive or negative, depending
on market conditions. The MID reduces the after-tax cost of
homeownership for a given price of home. However, by
increasing house prices, the MID increases the costs for
downpayment-constrained households, and for all house-
holds, this increases the opportunity costs of homeowner-
ship and the transaction costs of purchasing a home. Our
empirical analysis suggests that the MID has no discernible
impact on the level of U.S. homeownership. However, the
MID has a perverse effect in highly regulated housing mar-
kets. Because the supply of housing in such areas is inelas-
tic, rather than boosting homeownership attainment, much
of the MID is capitalized into housing prices. At the higher
housing price, certain types of households (e.g., down-
payment-constrained households) opt out of the market for
owner-occupied housing, yet full capitalization of the sub-
sidy and utilization of the housing stock can occur if the
remaining market segment increases housing consumption
in response to the subsidy. Only in markets with lax land
use regulation does the MID have a positive impact on
homeownership attainment, and the positive effect of the
MID occurs only for higher-income households. Our cost
simulations suggest that the subsidy cost per converted
homeowner amounts to a staggering $28,397 per new
homeowner per year.
These findings imply a disconnect between the context in
which a market failure exists and the context in which the
MID can correct the market failure. The proposition that
homeownership creates positive externalities, that the MID
creates homeownership, and therefore that the MID is a
Pigouvian subsidy may be intuitive at first glance, but it is
empirically false, for a subtle reason. Where a positive
externality from homeownership is likely to exist, in inelas-
tically supplied housing markets, we find the MID acts as a
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1 See, for example, Dietz and Haurin (2003) for an overview. Hoff and
Sen (2005) provide a theoretical rationale for why homeowner commu-
nities are associated with better civic environments: households with
identical preferences and abilities may segregate into communities by
tenure and income due to credit market imperfections. Civic effort
improves community quality but is noncontractible. Only homeowners
gain from the increase in property values; thus civic effort and its positive
externalities are confined to owner-occupied neighborhoods in which
civic effort is capitalized into house prices. A corollary, relevant for our
analysis, is that in places with elastic supply and no capitalization, home-
ownership may not be positively associated with civic effort (see Hilber,
2010, for empirical evidence consistent with this corollary).
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tax on homeownership. The MID does increase homeow-
nership attainment in elastically supplied housing markets,
but in these places, no positive externality from homeow-
nership is likely to exist.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses related research. Section III examines the
mechanisms by which the MID can affect incentives to own
and presents a stylized present value model to illustrate
these mechanisms. Section IV describes the measure we
use to capture the MID tax subsidy to homeowners. Section
V details the data and sample issues, outlines our empirical
approach and identification strategy, presents our empirical
findings, and discusses the quantitative significance and
robustness of the findings. Section VI concludes. In several
places, we refer interested readers to an online appendix
that reports several additional robustness checks not dis-
cussed in detail here.2
II. Related Research
While the exclusion of imputed rental income of owner-
occupied housing from taxable compensation is the key
tax benefit to homeowners (Poterba & Sinai, 2008), in the
presence of asymmetric tax treatment of property owners
(i.e., landlords versus owner-occupiers), the MID also
represents a sizable tax break to owner-occupied housing.
According to the tax law of the United States and most U.S.
states, landlords are taxed on their net rental income. The
interest on their mortgages is not a personal expense but an
expense necessary to earn the rental income. Owner-occu-
piers do not pay taxes on their imputed rental income, yet
they can deduct mortgage interest from their taxable
income. A voluminous literature recognizes the importance
of taking into account federal tax policy when examining
housing market outcomes (Rosen, 1979; Dynarski & Shef-
frin, 1985; Poterba, 1992; Turner & Smith, 2009). Early
efforts to determine the impacts of removing the pre-
ferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing on home-
ownership attainment include papers by Rosen (1979),
Hendershott and Shilling (1982), Rosen, Rosen, and Holtz-
Eakin, (1984), and Berkovec and Fullerton (1992), and
although the findings are not entirely conclusive, they
suggest that the tenure choice impacts of removing the
MID in isolation from other tax changes are likely to be
small.
Several studies highlight the need to consider housing
supply elasticities when examining the housing market
impacts of tax reform (Capozza, Green, & Hendershott,
1996; Green & Vandell, 1999). Capozza et al. (1996) main-
tain that the stock of prime residential land is inelastic, and
thus altering the current tax treatment of owner-occupied
housing will have price rather than quantity effects. In an
examination of rent-price ratios in 63 metropolitan areas,
Capozza et al. conclude that eliminating the mortgage
interest and property tax deduction would reduce house
prices by 2% to 13% depending on the metropolitan area.
Using the Public Use Microdata Sample of the 1990 Cen-
sus, Green and Vandell (1999) examine the likelihood of
homeownership, controlling for state fixed effects in an
effort to adjust for differing supply elasticities across
states, and find that replacing the MID with a revenue-neu-
tral tax credit would boost the national homeownership rate
by about 5 percentage points. More generally, the impor-
tance of the supply elasticity in determining equilibrium
prices in local housing markets is highlighted in recent
papers such as Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2010) and
Mayer (2011).
Several papers document that the distribution of (pri-
marily) federal housing tax benefits favors young and
higher-income homeowners and homeowners residing in
regions with high incomes and high house prices (Glaeser
& Shapiro, 2003; Sinai & Gyourko, 2004; Poterba & Sinai,
2008). However, high-income households also tend to be
higher-wealth households and therefore they are likely to
use equity financing to purchase their homes in the absence
of the mortgage interest deduction (Gervais & Pandey,
2008), thus further suggesting that the MID may have little
impact on homeownership attainment.
Two papers broach the subject of state mortgage subsi-
dies. Consistent with Capozza et al.’s (1996) finding that
the tax subsidies to homeowners primarily generate price
effects, Bourassa and Yin (2008) find that the combined
state and federal mortgage interest deduction has an adverse
effect on homeownership attainment of the young. In con-
trast, in an examination of state mortgage subsidies, Glaeser
and Shapiro (2003) report that state homeownership rates
are unrelated to the size of state subsidies. Taken as a
whole, the research suggests that the MID may not be a par-
ticularly effective policy tool for boosting homeownership
attainment. However, to our knowledge, no study to date
has sorted out the extent to which the MID impacts may
vary depending on local housing supply conditions, a task
we turn to next.
III. Capitalization Effects and Homeownership
A. Individual Incentive and Market-Wide Effects
There are two channels by which the MID may affect a
home buyer’s incentive to own. First, a positive, direct
homeownership incentive effect can occur because the MID
reduces the after-tax interest costs for buyers who finance
and itemize. This effect may increase the home buyer’s
willingness to pay and, thus, market demand along both the
extensive and intensive margins (i.e., the decision to own
and the amount of housing consumed). Second, as long as
the supply of housing is not perfectly elastic, a home
buyer’s incentives are also affected by the indirect market-
wide effect of rising house prices occurring due to the
aggregate behavior of market participants in response to the2 Available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org.
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subsidy. Through this channel, the subsidy, indirectly via
raising house prices, increases costs for down-payment-con-
strained households, reduces the odds that severely con-
strained households can obtain a mortgage, and increases
the transaction costs of buying a home.
Market adjustment is initiated by the direct incentive
effect, by which the subsidy increases individual demand of
households for owner-occupied housing but is then driven
by the resulting aggregate market demand and supply
responses. Due to an increase in the demand, the quantity of
owner-occupied housing may adjust along three margins:
conversions of nonresidential property, conversion of rental
stock to owner-occupied use, and the quantity of land used
for housing. The market-wide house price effect can be
expected to be stronger in tightly regulated, inelastically
supplied housing markets, wherein the MID can be
expected to mainly induce a reallocation of housing space
across individuals since increasing the supply of owner-
occupied housing and conversion from rental to owner-
occupied space are difficult. At one extreme, if the long-run
supply of owner-occupied housing in an area is perfectly
elastic (i.e., land use controls are lax and developable land
is available in abundance), the equilibrium purchase price
of housing can be expected to return to its presubsidy level.
The subsidy in this case results in an expanded housing
stock, an increased homeownership rate, and zero house
price capitalization at the new equilibrium. At the other
extreme, if tight regulatory constraints in a locale make the
supply of owner-occupied housing perfectly inelastic, the
subsidy will be fully capitalized into the purchase price of
owner-occupied housing, the owner-occupied housing stock
will not expand, and the subsidy fails to increase the home-
ownership rate (in fact, it may reduce it, as we point out
below). The capitalization of the subsidy into house prices
represents a one-time windfall gain for existing home-
owners. In elastically supplied markets, no such windfall
gain persists.
We speculate that the market-wide impacts of rising
house prices may have adverse consequences for at least
three types of households. First, households facing down
payment constraints have three choices when house prices
rise: (a) exit the market, (b) purchase later after they
acquire more wealth to meet the higher down payment
amount, or (c) own, but, to do so, accept increased lever-
age as the house price increase is rolled into the loan
amount. In the event of rigid loan-to-value requirements,
the household may not have the option of accepting higher
leverage and may instead be priced out of the market. Sec-
ond, residents with relatively short expected durations in a
given location may opt out of the owner-occupied market
when house prices rise due to increasing transactions costs
of owner occupation. These transactions costs include real-
tor fees that are proportional to house values (Hsieh &
Moretti, 2003), financing costs, and opportunity costs
(Haurin & Gill, 2002). Third, home buyers who are rela-
tively risk averse may opt out of the local market for
owner-occupied housing due to the subsidy-driven
increase in house prices. By driving up house prices, an
increase in the MID will require an increase in the amount
of a household’s portfolio allocated to owner-occupied
housing, an increase in the LTV, or both. A shifting of
more assets into owner-occupied housing to meet a higher
down payment decreases portfolio diversification and
therefore increases the household’s exposure to investment
risk. Higher leverage similarly increases this risk. Greater
exposure to investment risk, all else equal, is predicted to
decrease the likelihood that households own (Turner, 2003;
Hilber, 2005).
In a setting with inelastic supply and heterogeneous
households, certain types of households such as those
detailed above may opt out of the market for owner-occu-
pied housing as the asset price of housing rises, while
other households remain in the market and boost housing
consumption in response to the tax break induced by
the MID. In a sense, those who are down-payment-con-
strained, have a short expected duration, or are relatively
risk averse are bid out of the market. We thus speculate
that at the aggregate market level, the total physical quan-
tity of owner-occupied housing may remain unchanged,
yet the homeownership rate may fall because the subsidy
results in an increase in housing demand on the intensive
margin: those who remain in the market take up the slack
by increasing housing consumption in response to the
subsidy.
B. Present Value Description
In this section, we examine in more detail the two chan-
nels by which the MID can affect homeownership incen-
tives. To do so, we use a simple net present value (NPV)
model of the purchase price a home buyer is willing to pay
for a housing investment to illustrate the direct incentive
effect of the subsidy. Second, we refer to a theoretical
model by Glaeser et al. (2010) to assess the relevance of
market-wide equilibrium effects. Third, we consider the
effect of the MID on the NPV of a housing investment by
allowing the MID to be reflected both directly and indir-
ectly in the NPV expression. We find that the overall
effect of the MID on incentives to own is theoretically
ambiguous and depends on the housing supply elasticity
as well as other factors. When housing supply is perfectly
elastic, the MID will always have a positive effect on
incentives to own. However, when supply is not perfectly
elastic, our simulations suggest there are realistic scenar-
ios when the MID can have an adverse effect on the incen-
tives to own.
Asset market equilibrium requires that the price of a
house equals the present value of its net service flows dis-
counted at the individual’s real after-tax interest rate
(Poterba, 1984). Let P0 be the purchase price of a unit
house in the initial period. For a holding period of N years,
the NPV of the housing investment is
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NPV ¼  1 a0P0ð Þ
þPNt¼1 Rt  dt þ 1MSRtð Þatrt þ 1 stð Þdtð ÞPt1þ ið Þt
h i
þ 1uð ÞPN  LN
1þ ið ÞN ;
ð1Þ
where at represents the loan to value ratio, Pt is the house
value, and Rt is the rental value of the housing services gen-
erated by the housing stock in period t. dt equals the depre-
ciation and maintenance rate on the housing stock, rt equals
the nominal mortgage interest rate, tt represents the mar-
ginal tax rate, and dt represents the property tax rate in per-
iod t. MSRt is the mortgage subsidy rate at time t. i is the
real after-tax discount rate. u is the transaction cost of sell-
ing the housing stock as a percent of the selling price, and
LN is the remaining loan balance at the end of the holding
period. The first term of equation (1) is the down payment
amount, a cost incurred at the start of the holding period.
The middle term is the net consumption value of the house
(the rental value minus outlays), received in each year t,
over the holding period. The third term is the net proceeds
from the sale of the home at time N.3
Households may have different NPVs depending on their
marginal tax rates, down payment constraints, and their
expected duration in the property; however, in equilibrium,
the marginal buyer’s willingness to pay will equal the equi-
librium price, which equates to marginal cost. Glaeser et al.
(2010) present a model of homeownership on the extensive
margin with worker heterogeneity and variable housing
supply elasticity. While the objective of Glaeser et al. dif-
fers from ours, their model holds implications for the price
effects of the mortgage subsidy rate (MSR) according to the
supply elasticity, when the extensive margin is taken into
account. This is the context of our NPV model (i.e., whether
to purchase, whereby a condition for purchase is that the
home buyer’s NPV of the home investment is greater than
or equal to the market price). Utility maximization ensures
that buyer valuation on the margin just equals the cost
of buying at time t; by modeling the supply side directly,
Glaser et al. derive an equilibrium price expression in their
equation (7) that depends on a number of parameters,
including the value of the MSR. To generate a semi-elasti-
city of house prices with respect to the MSR that is a func-
tion of the housing supply elasticity, we differentiate the
log of the Glaeser et al. equilibrium price expression with
respect to the MSR. In what follows, we combine the mar-
ket-wide potential price effects implied by Glaeser et al. in
their equation (7) with the basic NPV model above to gen-
erate some implications regarding the decision to buy that
embody both the individual incentive and market-wide
effects.
We differentiate equation (1) with respect to the MSR,
allowing for the direct effect of the MSR, the home buyer’s
tax break, and the indirect effect through market prices,
@P0/@MSR, which yields
@NPV
@MSR
¼  1 a0ð Þ @P0
@MSR
þ
XN
t¼1
atrtPt
1þ ið Þt
 
þ
XN
t¼1
 dt þ 1 MSRtð Þatrt þ 1 stð Þdtð Þ
 @P0@MSR ð1þ
Pt
j¼1 pjÞ
ð1þ iÞt
2
6664
3
7775
þ 1 uð Þ
@P0
@MSR ð1þ
PN
j¼1 pjÞ  @LN@P0
@P0
@MSR
ð1þ iÞN : ð2Þ
We assume that a one-time increase in the MSR will affect
the purchase price, P0, not subsequent rates of house price
appreciation, pt. Now consider the case of a perfectly elastic
housing stock, which implies zero long-run house price
capitalization. Setting @P0/@MSR ¼ 0 eliminates all but the
second term of equation (2), resulting in an unambiguously
positive effect of the MSR on the NPV. This positive effect
is independent of the holding period and intuitively plausi-
ble: the MSR increases the home buyer’s incentive to own
by providing a tax break without inducing higher equili-
brium prices. In this context, the comparative statistic is
positive, but only for households that itemize deductions
and such households tend to have a higher income. Thus
equation (2) suggests that an increase in the subsidy will
tend to increase the desirability of a house purchase for
higher-income households in elastic markets.
In the case of a less than perfectly elastic housing stock,
some extent of market-wide house price capitalization is
implied and @P0/@MSR is positive. In this instance, equation
(2) cannot be readily signed. As noted in section IIIA, we
suspect that an adverse effect of a mortgage subsidy may
arise for certain households, such as those that are down-
payment-constrained. To examine whether this is so, we
undertake the following thought experiment: What is the
change in the NPV of a house purchase due to implementing
a MSR at 26% (the mean MSR in our sample) when partial
or full capitalization of the MSR into house prices occurs,
households have a fixed amount (20% of the presubsidy
house price) available for a down payment, and households
vary in their expected duration in the property? To incorpo-
rate the supply elasticity and market-wide price effects, tak-
ing into account the extensive margin, we use the Glaeser
et al. parameter assumptions and their equation (7) to evalu-
ate the semielasticity of prices with respect to the MSR. We
then compute the resulting equilibrium price change under
two different assumptions about the housing supply elasti-
city: a supply elasticity set equal to 2 and 0. We also con-
sider the change in the NPV assuming equilibrium house
prices rise by the present discounted value of the subsidy
3 For simplicity we ignore capital gains taxes in equation (1). Since the
Tax Reform Act of 1997, only capital gains on owner-occupied housing
in excess of $250,000 for single households ($500,000 for married cou-
ples filing jointly) are subject to the tax. See Shan (2011) for a recent dis-
cussion.
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over a 20-year holding period. Note that even in the case of
perfectly inelastic supply in the Glaeser et al. model, given
the parameter values, the equilibrium price increase is smal-
ler than the presented discounted value of the subsidy.4 An
increase in price equal to the present discounted value of the
subsidy reflects demand on both the extensive and intensive
margins, whereas the model by Glaeser et al. is one of
demand on the extensive margin only.
The stylized story we are presenting is that the capitaliza-
tion of the MSR into higher house prices is rolled into a larger
loan amount post subsidy since the household has a fixed
amount available for a down payment. While a potential
home buyer will ultimately benefit from the MSR-induced
higher value of the home at the time of sale, all else equal, the
potential buyer will also experience higher annual operating
and financing costs as a result of the MSR-induced increase
in house prices. The simulation of equation (2) under the var-
ious scenarios is presented in web appendix table A1. Our
simulations suggest that the MSR decreases the NPV of the
housing investment for down-payment-constrained potential
home buyers with short holding periods (up to three to four
years) and under the assumption of inelastic supply, either
assuming the price response implied by equation (7) of Glae-
ser et al. (2010) or assuming full capitalization. Our simula-
tions suggest that a negative NPV is feasible even in the case
of fairly (but not perfectly) elastic supply, but only for an
unrealistic holding period of one year. The simulation is sug-
gestive of a potentially noticeable negative impact of the
MSR on the probability of homeownership in metropolitan
areas with inelastic supply, particularly since most house-
holds in those places face down payment constraints and the
median holding period in the United States is six years.5
While this is a stylized example, we think it is a plausible one
for many potential home buyers. It is not intended to prove
that an adverse effect of the MSR exists in inelastically sup-
plied markets but that an adverse effect may exist. Next we
empirically test for such an effect.
C. Measures of Housing Supply Elasticity
There is ample evidence that indices of the restrictiveness
of land use regulation are good proxies for the housing sup-
ply inelasticity and thus for the potential for house price
adjustment as a consequence of a demand shock or, conver-
sely, expansion of owner-occupied housing through new
construction. For example, Quigley and Raphael (2005) use a
city-level index of regulatory stringency for California cities
and relate this index to local house prices in 1990 and 2000.
They document that more regulated cities have more expen-
sive housing and a slower growth in housing stock. They con-
firm that these more regulated places also have a lower price
elasticity of housing supply. In a similar vein, Saks (2008)
demonstrates that locations with relatively few barriers to
construction experience more residential construction and
smaller increases in house prices in response to an increase in
housing demand. Lutz (2009) examines the effect of a large
exogenous shift in property tax burdens induced by a 1999
school finance reform in New Hampshire. His estimates sug-
gest that in most of the state, municipalities with a reduced
tax burden experienced a large increase in residential con-
struction. In the area of the state near Boston, the region’s pri-
mary urban center, however, the shock cleared through price
adjustment. Lutz attributes these differing responses to dif-
fering housing supply elasticities, likely caused by spatial
differences in regulatory restrictiveness. Finally, Saiz (2010)
uses a current measure of regulatory restrictiveness—the
Wharton regulatory index that captures the restrictiveness of
regulation around 2005—and relates this directly to mea-
sures of supply elasticity, demonstrating that more regulated
metropolitan areas have more inelastic supply.
In the empirical analysis that follows, we employ a mea-
sure of regulatory restrictiveness, compiled by Saks (2008),
as our proxy for the responsiveness of the owner-occupied
housing stock to changes in house prices. Saks (2008)
derives a combined measure of regulatory restrictiveness
for the late 1970s and the 1980s by using the simple aver-
age of six independent surveys conducted during this time
period. The index is scaled to have a mean of 0 and a stan-
dard deviation of 1. The index ranges from 2.21 for New
York (most restrictive) to 2.40 for Bloomington-Normal,
Illinois. Generally, desirable coastal metropolitan areas
such as New York, San Francisco, San Diego, Los Angeles,
and Boston are most tightly regulated, whereas metropoli-
tan areas in the Midwest and the South tend to have lax land
use controls. However, there is considerable within-state
variation in the regulatory index. For example, while most
metropolitan areas in California are tightly regulated, the
index ranges from þ2.1 for San Francisco to 0.32 for
Orange County. Similarly, while metropolitan areas in
Texas tend to have relatively lax regulation controlling the
expansion of the housing stock, the index ranges from
1.18 for Dallas to þ0.98 for Tyler. The most extreme dif-
ference can be found in the state of New York. Whereas
New York City tops the index table with þ2.21, Buffalo–
Niagara Falls is the second least tightly regulated place with
an index of 1.96. (See Saks, 2008, and in particular her
table A2 for further details.)
Our regression analysis relies on the assumption that the
Saks index is exogenous to individual tenure decisions. This
assumption seems plausible for two reasons. First, the Saks
index has the important advantage, compared to more
recent measures of regulatory restrictiveness, that it essen-
tially predates our sample period and hence is exogenous to
(not determined by) subsequent changes in tax policies and
4 For example, assuming an initial purchase price of $200,000 and per-
fectly inelastic housing supply, as detailed in the online appendix table
A1, using equation (7) and parameter values of Glaeser et al. (2010), we
find the equilibrium price increase resulting from implementing an MSR
of 26% equals $43,628. In contrast, the discounted present value of a sub-
sidy equal to 26% on a $200,000 house value over a twenty-year holding
period is $51,942.
5 The statistic is based on data from the National Association of Real-
tors (NAR) for the years 2001 to 2006 (statistic provided by Walter Mol-
ony, analyst for the NAR, April 2007).
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subsequent housing tenure decisions (and changes in home-
ownership rates) during the 1990s and 2000s.6 Second, the
index captures regulatory restrictiveness at the MSA-level
(not at the local level, where planning boards are elected),
and we control for MSA-level fixed effects that capture
time-invariant unobservable MSA-level specific characteris-
tics (e.g., the city-specific prospects for long-run future busi-
ness investment) that may jointly determine past regulatory
constraints and future individual tenure decisions. It is there-
fore plausible to assume that our measure of regulatory
restrictiveness is uncorrelated with the error term. The Saks
index may also be preferable over geographical or physical
constraints measures. First, whereas tight regulatory con-
straints may always be binding and magnify price responses
to demand shocks even if ample developable land is avail-
able, places with lax regulation and comparably little devel-
opable land may still have quite elastic supply. Various stu-
dies are indicative that geographical and physical constraints
may be affecting price responses to demand shocks only in
highly urbanized areas such as Boston or the Greater London
area (Lutz, 2009; Hilber & Vermeulen, forthcoming).7
Third, in contrast to geographical constraints, regulatory
constraints may also complicate or hinder the conversion of
existing housing that is suitable for renter occupation to
housing that is more amenable for owner occupation, thereby
limiting the quantity supplied of owner-occupied housing.
For these reasons, we conduct our empirical analysis with
the index measure generated by Saks (2008). In this con-
text, Saks’s finding that in more strictly regulated metropo-
litan areas house prices respond more strongly to changes
in housing demand is particularly reassuring, as it supports
our implicit assumption that in more tightly regulated
places (defined as in our study), the extent of capitalization
of demand factors (e.g., the mortgage subsidy), is greater.
In a further attempt to confirm our implicit assumption that
house price capitalization effects are greater in more tightly
regulated places, we conduct a simple test of the proposi-
tion that regulatory restrictiveness affects the extent to
which the mortgage subsidy rate raises house prices within
our sample. Table A2 in the appendix reports the results of
regressing the log of the house price index on the MSR
(panel A) and the house price appreciation rate on the per-
centage change in the MSR (panel B), respectively, control-
ling for year and MSA fixed effects as well as state and
MSA time trends. Results are reported separately for highly
regulated places (all metropolitan areas with regulatory
stringency of at least 1 standard deviation above the mean)
and little regulated places (all metropolitan areas with a reg-
ulatory stringency of at least 1 standard deviation below the
mean). The results in both panels confirm that more regu-
lated places have a much greater extent of capitalization of
the MSR. The effect is between four and twelve times as
large in the more regulated places and is statistically signifi-
cant only in those places. While this is a preliminary and
rather coarse look at capitalization, it is suggestive.
It is also worth noting that other studies (e.g., Quigley &
Raphael, 2005, for the United States; Hilber & Vermeulen,
forthcoming, for the United Kingdom) that use different
measures to proxy for regulatory stringency also come to
the same conclusion: house prices react more strongly to
demand shocks (i.e., the extent of house price capitalization
is greater) in more tightly regulated markets and hence, all
else equal, housing is more expensive in those markets.
Finally, in addition to the regulatory control, the homeow-
nership specifications we estimate control for housing stock
composition in the census tracts in which the households
reside in order to capture at least in part the other aspect of
housing supply elasticity: the extent to which the existing
rental stock can be converted to owner-occupied use.
IV. Measuring the Combined State and Federal
Mortgage Interest Deduction
Our key variable of interest is the combined federal and
state subsidy to home owners through use of the federal and
state (where applicable) mortgage interest deductions.
While data reported in the PSID allow for the construction
of each household’s mortgage interest paid, itemization sta-
tus, and an approximation of the marginal tax savings the
household receives from claiming the MID, using the
household’s actual marginal tax savings from the MID is
not appropriate. The household’s actual mortgage subsidy
rate is a complicated function of the household’s character-
istics that also determine the likelihood of homeownership
and would therefore be endogenous in a tenure choice
model. Instead, we use a measure generated in the spirit of
Cutler and Gruber (1996) that is correlated with the indivi-
dual’s mortgage subsidy rate, but exogenous and not corre-
lated with the other determinants of homeownership. This
measure is the NBER average state and federal combined
mortgage interest subsidy rate, which is publicly available
and generated by the NBER based on a large, fixed, nation-
ally representative sample of 1995 individual tax returns for
each state and year, provided by the Statistics of Income
Division of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.
The NBER measure is generated as follows (Feenberg &
Coutts, 1993). State and federal income tax liabilities owed
by a large sample of taxpayers in each state in each year are
calculated, holding the sample and income distribution
fixed. The mortgage interest is then increased by 1% for
each taxpayer, the state and federal taxes are recalculated,
6 More recent measures of regulatory restrictiveness, such as the Whar-
ton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI) from around 2005
(see Gyourko, Saiz, & Summers, 2008) have the drawback that the level
of regulatory restrictiveness may be caused by changes in homeownership
rates during our sample period, which may in turn be affected by changes
in the MSR.
7 Saiz (2010) considers the impact of the presence of water bodies and
slopes steeper than 15 degrees. While such constraints significantly
restrict coastal areas and areas with major mountain chains, many metro-
politan areas are neither coastal nor located near major mountain chains,
yet they likely vary significantly in their supply elasticity. Saiz also com-
puted a direct measure of supply elasticity, but this is based in part on
the—for our purposes—endogenous WRLURI index.
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and the mortgage interest subsidy is generated as the ratio
of the additional tax (savings) to the additional mortgage
interest. The measure captures the tax savings from an addi-
tional dollar of mortgage interest, or, equivalently, the mar-
ginal subsidy rate on mortgage interest. The average MSR
in a given state and year is then computed by averaging
over taxpayers by state and year.
The NBER measure has a number of desirable features.
First, it varies only due to changes in the federal and state
tax laws, not due to changes in income or other household
characteristics of the taxpayer sample. Second, using a large
microsample to generate a taxpayer-level subsidy measure
and then averaging over all taxpayers by state and year cap-
tures the nonlinearity and richness in the tax code that
would not be captured by the use of a more aggregated
approach (such as running state median income through a
tax calculator). Moreover, because the NBER MSR mea-
sure is the simple average of all taxpayers’ MSRs, we can
derive the marginal effect of interest, the variation of the
impact of the MSR by income status, without having an
income-specific measure of the MSR: the marginal effects
by income status controlling for the average MSR by
income group and the marginal effects by income status
controlling for the NBER MSR will be proportional (by a
factor equal to the number of income categories).8 Third,
using the average MSR in the state and year in which a
household is observed provides an exogenous measure of
the MSR for our household-level analysis.
As presented in section IIIA, there are two effects of the
MSR. First is the direct incentive effect of the subsidy for
individuals. By use of the noted interaction terms, we can
sort out the incentive effects by income group. Second is
the indirect effect on house prices through the average mar-
ket effect—essentially a reduced-form effect. As presented
in section V, we empirically distinguish the incentive ver-
sus market effects by controlling for supply conditions. The
MSR controls are capturing the incentive effect, and the
degree of regulatory restrictiveness interacted with the
MSR captures the market price effect. In models that fail to
control for the supply elasticity, the MSR effect would be a
combination of the incentive and market effects.
The variation in the combined state and federal NBER
measure across states and within states over time can result
from changes in the federal tax code, the state tax code, or
both. The federal subsidy rate is affected by changes in the
federal tax code that alter income definitions, itemization
status, and marginal tax rates in particular. During the time
period we examine, there are five major instances of federal
tax law changes. These occur in 1986, 1993, 1997, 2001,
and 2003. Reductions in marginal tax rates at the federal
level may arise due to tax reform, as in the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA86), or fiscal stimulus (2001 and 2003 Bush-
era tax cuts), but in both instances they reduce the value of
the federal MID. In contrast, the 1993 and 1997 tax law
changes increased marginal taxes rates, increasing the value
of the federal MSR, but they also put in place phase-outs on
some itemized deductions. Although states have a high
degree of sovereignty in designing their tax codes, changes
in the federal tax code may directly or indirectly trigger
changes in state tax laws. For example, a change in federal
marginal tax rates changes the value of deducting state
taxes paid (income, sales, and property), which can affect
the mix of tax instruments used at the state level.9 Changes
in federal tax structure can also directly affect the value of
a state-level MID. For example, eight states have reciprocal
deductibility whereby federal taxes are also deductible from
state taxable income (Fisher, 2007), and therefore changes
in federal taxes paid affect the state marginal tax rate faced
by the taxpayer and hence the value of the state MSR.
Some changes in the state MSR come about independent
of changes in the federal tax code. States implement tax law
changes when state fiscal crises arise or to mimic neighbor-
ing states’ policies (Howe & Reeb, 1997). A series of
papers has examined the impact of tax competition between
states on state tax law structure (Besley & Case, 1995). Het-
erogeneity in state tax structure also arises due to variation
in states’ efforts to rely on taxes that allow an ‘‘exporting’’
of tax burdens to nonresidents. This includes the example
of relying on tax sources that are deductible from federal
taxable income. Other examples include the use of sales
and business taxes that are expected to be shifted to resi-
dents of other states (Fisher, 2007).
In general, state income tax structures are not uniform
across states and do not necessarily conform to the federal
tax structure (Fisher, 2007). Based on the variation in state
tax structures and states’ reactions to changes in federal tax
structure, we expect that the variation in the MSR across
and within states over time may be large. To determine if
this is indeed the case, we examine a second NBER series,
the average net state mortgage interest subsidy by state and
year, which we refer to as the state MSR. A state’s MSR
gives the mortgage subsidy rate arising from the state
income tax structure. This NBER series is constructed in
the same manner as the combined mortgage interest subsidy
but is derived from the state income tax liabilities only of
the fixed 1995 taxpayer sample. Table 1 reports summary
statistics for both the state MSR and the combined MSR
series in each state for the time period we analyze (1984–
2007).
8 To see this is so, consider a simplified example with two types of
households: high income (D1 ¼ 1) and low income (D2 ¼ 1). Let X1 equal
the MSR received by high-income households and X2 equal the MSR
received by low-income households. Then the NBER MSR measure can
be expressed as X ¼ (X1 þ X2)/2. A regression controlling for X1 and X2
(interacted with D1 and D2, respectively) will yield coefficient estimates
that equal two times the corresponding estimates from controlling for X
(interacted with D1 and D2).
9 A strong consensus exists in the literature that the federal deductibility
of state taxes (income, sales, and property) causes states to rely more
heavily on these sources of revenue than on non-federally deductible
taxes (Feldstein & Metcalf, 1987; Feenberg & Rosen, 1986; Metcalf,
2011; Holtz-Eakin & Rosen, 1988).
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Notice in table 1 the significant variation in the state
MSR across U.S. states. The average subsidy rate in Ore-
gon, for example, is 8.12 cents for every dollar of mortgage
interest, whereas the average subsidy rate in Alabama is
only 3.56 cents. Comparing the minimum to the maximum
values in table 1, we see that of the 34 states that have a
state MSR, over half have a state subsidy rate that changes
by at least 2 percentage points over this time period; in
some states, the change in the state MSR is sizable: in Ari-
zona, New York, and Wisconsin, the state MSR changes by
nearly 100% over the 24-year period under consideration.
Finally, note that for the 16 states without a state MSR, the
combined MSR nonetheless changes, reflecting the change
in the federal MSR subsidy received by the taxpayers in
these states at different points in time.10
How much of the variation shown in table 1 is common
across states and hence would be swept up by year fixed
effects? Figure 1 shows the variation in the state MSR by
state over time.11 No typical pattern emerges. The subsidy
TABLE 1.—NBER MORTGAGE SUBSIDY RATE BY U.S. STATE IN %, 1984–2007 (PSID SAMPLE YEARS ONLY)
U.S. State
Average State
Net MSR S.D. Minimum Maximum
Average
Combined MSR S.D. Minimum Maximum
Alabama 3.56 0.12 3.29 3.72 25.19 2.10 22.8 29.37
Alaska 0 0 0 0 26.92 3.10 23.21 33.3
Arizona 4.21 0.86 3.37 5.61 26.14 2.11 23.19 30.51
Arkansas 5.46 0.83 3.81 6.43 28.26 1.62 25.95 31.22
California 6.01 0.32 5.43 6.54 26.67 1.41 24.94 29.48
Colorado 4.71 0.27 4.44 5.28 27.08 2.07 24.55 31.48
Connecticut 0.06 0.07 0 0.22 25.60 2.45 22.89 30.55
Delaware 6.41 0.87 5.1 8.56 27.37 2.21 24.06 31.95
District of Columbia 8.98 0.56 7.94 10.17 34.68 2.60 32.36 40.48
Florida 0 0 0 0 22.97 2.14 20.15 27.22
Georgia 5.32 0.11 5.21 5.56 27.78 2.26 25.32 32.68
Hawaii 8.86 0.67 7.57 9.46 28.20 1.75 25.31 31.83
Idaho 5.74 0.37 4.96 6.56 25.81 2.22 22.76 29.71
Illinois 0 0 0 0 24.50 2.37 21.73 29.48
Indiana 0 0 0 0 23.62 2.35 20.26 28.11
Iowa 5.59 0.21 5.25 5.81 27.63 2.03 25.1 31.93
Kansas 5.33 0.84 3.07 6.19 28.83 2.33 25.85 33.66
Kentucky 5.26 0.72 3.96 5.83 27.80 1.93 25.63 31.4
Louisiana 2.23 1.37 1.45 3.08 26.78 2.71 21.74 31.23
Maine 7.28 0.36 6.31 7.78 28.13 1.79 25.98 31.53
Maryland 3.89 1.70 0.06 4.69 26.49 0.97 24.56 28.08
Massachusetts 0 0 0 0 24.18 2.12 21.65 28.74
Michigan 0 0 0 0 25.03 2.42 21.93 29.94
Minnesota 7.05 1.08 5.34 9.59 29.40 3.36 25.05 37.39
Mississippi 4.04 0.31 3.47 4.53 27.80 1.67 25.22 31.08
Missouri 4.19 0.53 3.38 4.93 27.26 1.84 24.95 30.58
Montana 5.25 0.86 3.56 6.19 26.12 1.93 24.13 29.59
Nebraska 5.02 0.52 4.17 6.3 27.05 1.82 25.09 30.79
Nevada 0 0 0 0 24.23 1.90 21.77 28.11
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 23.00 2.08 20.49 27.46
New Jersey 0 0 0 0 24.70 2.29 22.2 29.68
New Mexico 5.29 0.80 3.69 6.22 26.88 1.30 24.15 28.9
New York 5.73 1.21 4.44 8.49 28.26 2.60 25.88 34.23
North Carolina 6.27 0.53 5.52 7.05 28.49 1.78 26.53 31.81
North Dakota 3.28 0.17 3.08 3.58 27.51 2.61 24.89 33.36
Ohio 0 0 0 0 24.23 2.31 21.35 28.9
Oklahoma 4.56 2.44 0.4 6.41 26.70 2.09 24.72 30.79
Oregon 8.12 0.51 6.7 8.86 28.97 2.11 26.45 33.64
Pennsylvania 0 0 0 0 24.03 2.26 21.25 28.56
Rhode Island 5.22 0.50 4.31 6.07 26.10 2.46 23.37 31.69
South Carolina 5.90 0.44 5.3 6.52 27.29 2.14 24.23 31.84
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 22.86 2.11 20.52 27.59
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 24.50 2.42 20.96 29.25
Texas 0 0 0 0 25.55 2.68 22.26 30.83
Utah 6.07 0.41 5.41 7.34 25.70 1.62 23.73 29.13
Vermont 5.72 0.70 4.4 6.76 27.48 2.67 24.07 33.25
Virginia 5.29 0.12 5.15 5.49 27.99 1.89 25.82 32.04
Washington 0 0 0 0 22.12 1.88 19.37 25.8
West Virginia 0.87 2.06 0 5.6 23.00 2.77 19.66 28.89
Wisconsin 4.84 0.79 3.73 7.15 27.56 2.30 24.98 32.96
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 21.77 3.20 18.71 28.58
10 The following states are not represented in our PSID sample, but are
included in table 1 and figure 1 for illustrative purposes: Delaware, Iowa,
Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Vermont.
11 All graphs are normalized to a bandwidth of 5 percentage points,
except Oklahoma, which has a vertical range from 0 to 7 percentage points.
States not pictured do not have a state MSR during the time period consid-
ered, except Connecticut. It has a state MSR, but it is very small and gra-
phically indistinguishable from 0 if the regular bandwidth is applied.
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rises over time in some states and declines in others. Impor-
tantly, there is significant variation across states in the
changes in the state MSR following federal tax reform. For
example, following TRA86, the state MSR rose in a number
of states, including Louisiana, Maryland, and Arkansas, but
fell in others, such as Rhode Island and Minnesota.
V. Empirical Analysis
A. Data and Sample Issues
This paper uses data from multiple sources. The primary
data source is three decades of data from the confidential
version of the PSID, a longitudinal survey of families—
from whom we (confidentially) know their census tract of
residence—that has been carried out continuously since
1968 and provides a unique opportunity to follow house-
holds over time and across space.12 We select all PSID
households observed from 1984 to 2007. We begin the
panel in 1984, the first year in which the PSID collects
information on the household wealth holdings. Data are col-
lected annually until 1997 and biennially after 1997, pro-
FIGURE 1.—NET STATE NBER SOI MORTGAGE SUBSIDY RATE BY U.S. STATES, 1984–2007 (%)
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The series are the NBER SOI average net state mortgage subsidy rate (MSR) in each state and year and show the state-level mortgage interest subsidy rate. The series are generated based on a large, fixed, represen-
tative sample of U.S. taxpayers (the income distribution is held fixed) and vary only due to changes in federal and state tax laws that affect specifically state-level income tax structure. States not pictured do not have
a state-level MSR during the time period considered. All graphs are normalized to a range of 5 percentage points, except Oklahoma, which has a range from 0 to 7 percentage points.
12 The PSID tract and MSA location indicators are confidential data
from the PSID GEOCODE data files and can be obtained from the PSID
under special contract. These data are not available from the authors.
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viding up to nineteen observations per household.13 The
data include (a) the original 1968 PSID core sample of
5,000 households selected as a random cross-section sample
of the U.S. population with an additional low-income sam-
ple and (b) persons living within a household unit that enter
the sample as a separate household when they form their
own household. The PSID reconstituted its sample in 1997
by dropping one-third of the core sample, changing to bien-
nial data collection, and reformatting sample weights. Thus,
our sample includes only households observed from 1984
through 2007, roughly two-thirds of the original core sam-
ple. All of the household data used in this study are col-
lected in each year of observation, except wealth data. Prior
to 1997, the wealth data are collected every five years. After
1997, they are collected with each survey. For the pre-1997
wealth data, we apply a linear function to impute annual
estimates of total net wealth.
In addition to the confidential version of the PSID, we
use four secondary data sources, all publicly available, that
report data at the tract, metropolitan area, or state level. The
NBER provides the mortgage subsidy rate, our key variable
of interest discussed above, as well as a property tax sub-
sidy rate (generated similarly). Our second source is the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). From the FHFA
we derive mortgage interest rate data as well as house price
indexes.14 Specifically, the FHFA provides data on metro-
politan and state average effective mortgage interest rates at
the time of mortgage origination for conventional, single-
family, nonfarm loans. The data are from the FHFA’s
Monthly Interest Rate Survey and are computed based on
fully amortized loans. Refinances, nonamortized loans, and
balloon loans are excluded from the FHFA data, as are non-
conventional loans (www.fhfa.gov). We use metropolitan-
area data whenever available and state-level data for PSID
households that are not residing in one of the FHFA
reported metropolitan areas. The effective mortgage interest
rate is the contracted rate adjusted for fees and charges. We
use the mortgage interest rate data as part of the user cost
controls in a robustness check of our main specifications.
The house price index and appreciation data, used in web
appendix table A2 as well as in specifications controlling
for the relative cost of homeownership, also come from the
FHFA. FHFA produces public use house price indexes at
the metropolitan and state levels using a repeat sales metho-
dology and data on single-family properties whose loans
have been purchased or securitized by Freddie Mac or Fan-
nie Mae over the years (see www.fhfa.gov). As with the
FHFA interest rate data, we use the metropolitan-level in-
dexes where available and the state-level indexes for
households that are not residing in one of the FHFA metro-
politan areas. The third source is the 1980 U.S. Census,
which provides tract-level data on the composition of the
housing stock. The specific variables we examine include
the share of housing units in the tract that are single family
and the share of units that are in multiplexes (structures
with five or more units). We use the 1980 composition of
the housing stock as it will be exogenous in an analysis of
the probability of homeownership after 1980. Finally, as
noted in section IIIC, we use the metropolitan-level regula-
tory index generated by Saks (2008) as a measure of the
housing supply inelasticity. We link all of these data to
PSID households using confidential PSID geographic loca-
tion information.
The final sample contains 4,197 households correspond-
ing to 53,279 household-year observations residing in
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas for the base empiri-
cal specifications and 2,620 households corresponding to
29,621 household-year observations residing in metropoli-
tan areas for which we have Saks (2008) regulatory index
data. Roughly 2.5% of households move to a different state
and 4% of households move to a different MSA in any
given year. All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2007 dollars
using the urban Consumer Price Index. All analysis is
weighted using the PSID 2005 sample weights.15
B. Empirical Approach
We estimate the following base specification for house-
hold i in location j at time t as a linear probability model:
Pr ownijt
  ¼ a0 þ a1MSRjt þ X0itbþ L0jtdþ D0ikþ ei;
ð3Þ
where MSR is the mortgage subsidy rate, which is expected
to have a positive coefficient to the extent that it facilitates
homeownership. The household’s MSR varies over time
even if the household does not move at all or moves only
within the state. This is because the MSR varies within state
over time. X is a vector of household characteristics that
vary over time, L is a vector of time-invariant and time-
varying location controls, and D is a vector of individual
fixed effects. The vector of time-varying household charac-
teristics includes controls for total family income, total net
wealth, age of head, marital status, children, and unemploy-
ment of head and spouse if present. We control for income
13 Due to missing data, we allow for an unbalanced panel in our analy-
sis in order to include the greatest number of households. Our full regres-
sion sample underlying the specifications reported in table 4 consists of
53,279 observations, which is roughly 67% of the fully balanced sample.
Nineteen percent of households are observed every year, roughly 50% are
observed in at least fourteen years, and 15% are observed for five years or
less. The sample underlying the regulatory interaction specifications
reported in table 5 is slightly more unbalanced. Due to missing values,
this sample consists of 29,621 observations, which is roughly 60% of the
fully balanced sample.
14 Until 2008, the most recent entity to generate the interest rate series
was the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB). It was combined with
OFHEO in 2008 to form the FHFA.
15 The PSID sample is not representative of the U.S. population without
the application of sample weights. The post-1997 weights are stratified to
the U.S. population according to data from the Current Population Sur-
vey. See Heeringa and Connor (1999) for more discussion. We use the
2005 combined family weight because the more recent 2007 weight is
preliminary and not available for as many households as the 2005 weight.
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by the use of three income categories: low, moderate, or
high income. A low-income household is one whose annual
income is less than or equal to 80% of state median income;
moderate-income households include households with
incomes between 80% and 120% of state median income,
and high-income households are those with incomes above
120% of state median income.16 The vector of location
characteristics includes tract-level housing composition
controls (the share of housing units that are single family
units and the share of housing units in multiplexes), MSA
fixed effects, and state fixed effects. The rationale for
including both MSA and state fixed effects is that not all
households reside in MSAs. The state fixed effects provide
location controls for those places. Also, there could be
unobservable time-invariant effects at the MSA and state
level. We also estimate equation (3) with MSA and state
time trends to control for unobserved factors at the MSA
and state level that may affect homeownership attainment
and may be changing over time. We estimate equation (3)
with a cluster correction to generate standard errors that are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on two dimen-
sions: households and State  Year. We simultaneously
cluster on these two dimensions to address the possibility
that the errors may be serially correlated or spatially auto-
correlated at the state level. While clustering on households
deals with the serial correlation issue, clustering on State 
Year addresses the possibility of spatial autocorrelation at
the state level.17 We also run specifications that allow for a
differential impact of tax subsidies depending on the house-
hold’s income by interacting MSR with income status.
One advantage of estimating equation (3) as a fixed-
effect model is that household fixed effects capture all
unobserved heterogeneity in household characteristics, such
as race/ethnicity of the household head, that are time invar-
iant. To the extent that households do not move, the fixed
effects also capture time-invariant location characteristics
(at neighborhood, municipality, county, state, region, and
national levels). However, households do move across
space, and we observe such changes in our panel. As a
result, we also include the location controls discussed
above. Regarding total net wealth, note that changes in net
asset wealth are driven in part by changes in income.
Hence, once we control for fixed effects and household
income, the impact of household net wealth on homeowner-
ship attainment can be expected to be quite limited.
The use of state fixed effects in our empirical setup
implies that we identify the effect of the MSR on the pro-
pensity to own off of variation in the MSR over time within
states as well as across states. As noted above, the house-
hold’s MSR varies over time even if the household does not
move at all or moves only within state. This is because the
MSR varies within state over time. The household fixed
effects allow us to also identify off of across-state moves.
Being able to use across-state moves in addition to within-
state moves is arguably an added benefit of our approach,
particularly since across-state moves are often associated
with substantive changes in the MSR. However, impor-
tantly, the household fixed effects do not preclude us from
identifying off of within-state moves or nonmoves. In fact,
most of the variation in the MSR of households is driven by
within-state changes of the MSR over time, which affect
both within-state movers and nonmovers. Only roughly 3%
of all changes in the MSR are driven by across-state moves.
We document the relevance of the two sources of variation
(i.e., arising from changes in the MSR within state over
time or arising from moves across states at different points
in time) in the section VC.
One concern with across-state movers is that they may
not be similar over time and across states, and this may lead
to a selection bias. In particular, households that move
across states may be different from the rest of the popula-
tion (i.e., nonmovers and within-state movers), and it may
be the characteristics of the across-state movers that explain
our estimated effects rather than the subsidy rate itself. To
address this concern, we check for whether our results are
being driven by across-state moves. To do this, we reesti-
mate our core specifications but additionally include House-
hold  State fixed effects in order to control for all state-
specific unobserved characteristics of across-state movers.18
Put differently, for each household, we exploit only within-
state variation in the MSR, ignoring variation that arises
from across-state moves.
To explore the impact of regulatory restrictiveness, we
estimate the following specification for household i in loca-
tion j at time t, again, as a linear probability model:
Pr ownijt
  ¼ a0 þ a1MSRjt þ a2MSRjt  regjt þ a3regjt
þ X0itbþ L
0
jtdþ D
0
ikþ ei; ð4Þ
16 We use state median income data from the U.S. Census Bureau, table
H-7, which provides annual median income estimates by state from 1984
to 2007, based on the Current Population Survey. Regarding the income
classifications, note that state homeownership assistance programs, such as
Florida’s State Housing Initiatives Partnership Program, the largest state
housing trust fund, use these income definitions. For an example, see
http://www.floridahousing.org/Home/HousingPartners/LocalGovernments.
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s HOME pro-
gram, which supports homeownership, defines low income as 80% of
MSA median income (http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing
/lawsandregs/index.cfm).
17 The reported standard errors are similar to those generated in specifi-
cations that use only a Huber-White sandwich estimator to correct for het-
eroskedasticity and those resulting from specifications that cluster only on
households but not on State  Year groupings. Clustering by state is pro-
blematic in our empirical setup because households move across states
over time so the panels are not nested within state clusters (but they are
nested within a given state and year).
18 To see how we construct the Household  State fixed effects, con-
sider an example. Suppose a household resides in two states during our
observation period: the household is observed living in California and
then moves to Texas. We create two mutually exclusive indicator vari-
ables for this household: the first equals 1 in each year the household is in
California and 0 otherwise. The other equals 1 in each year the household
is in Texas and 0 otherwise. These fixed effects ensure that we only iden-
tify off of changes in the MSR that are not due to households moving
across states.
628 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
where reg equals the value of the regulatory index, scaled
to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, with
higher values of the index indicating greater regulatory
restrictiveness and hence more inelastic housing supply.
The theoretical considerations presented in section III sug-
gest that a2 < 0: the positive impact of the subsidy on
homeownership attainment ought to be weaker (and the
negative impact stronger) in more regulated metropolitan
areas. Note that regjt varies in the panel even though our
regulatory proxy is time invariant and varies only by loca-
tion. This is because regjt varies as households move
between metropolitan areas and thereby move from more to
less restrictive places and vice versa. We also run specifica-
tions where the regulatory index is interacted with the MSR
and with income status in order to investigate the extent to
which different income groups are differentially affected by
the mortgage subsidy rate in different regulatory environ-
ments. As with estimating equation (3), we estimate equa-
tion (4) simultaneously clustering on households and State 
Year.
Missing from the analysis so far is a control for the rela-
tive cost of homeownership: the cost of housing services in
the owner mode relative to the cost of housing services in
the rental mode. In studies of homeownership, the annual
cost of housing services in the owner mode is generally
approximated as the user cost of housing, which is a house-
hold-specific variable measuring the expected consumption
value of the housing services from purchasing a home. The
user cost is the sum of depreciation and maintenance costs,
the after-tax opportunity cost of the down payment, the
after-tax mortgage interest payments, and after-tax property
tax payments minus the expected, nominal capital gain on
the housing structure (Poterba, 1984). Of these components
of user cost, equations (3) and (4) control for the MSR. As
a robustness check, we also run the models in equation (4)
adding controls for additional determinants of user cost: the
FHFA reported effective mortgage interest rate, the NBER
property tax subsidy rate, and the FHFA contemporaneous
house price appreciation rate, as well as the price of rental
housing, which we control for as the average annual rent in
the city and year in which the family is observed.19
C. Results
Table 2 presents population-weighted summary statistics
for the full sample and the regulatory restrictiveness sub-
sample. Table 3 summarizes the sources of variation in the
MSR. Table 3A reports the distribution of moves by type
(within state and across state) for the full regression sample
according to five possibilities: no change in the MSR, a
change in the MSR, and then by three different magnitudes
of change in the MSR. Categories 1 and 2 in table 3 show
that there are 50,216 household-year observations in the
panel for which we observe data from one year to the next.
Of these, 49,873 household-year observations experience a
change in the MSR from the prior year and 343 do not.
Among the 49,873 household-year observations that experi-
ence a change in the MSR since the previous year, the vast
majority, 97%, are not across-state moves. Category 1
shows that some moves occur both within and across states,
even though the MSR is unchanged. Category 2 shows that
we observe 9,161 household-year moves that are accompa-
nied by a change in the MSR. Of these, 7,653 are within-
state moves and 1,508 are across-state moves. Note that
among identified moves in category 2, 84% are within-state
moves (this percentage may actually be a little higher since
we cannot identify within-Census-tract moves).20 When we
consider the distribution of moves by type for varying
degrees of change in the MSR, we see that only for the most
substantial changes in the MSR (5% or higher), as shown in
category 5, the across-state moves dominate the sample, but
they are not the only source of variation. Of the 372 house-
hold-year observations that experience a change in the
MSR greater than 5% from one year to the next, 55% are
associated with across-state moves, the remaining changes
are associated with either within-state moves (6%) or non-
moves across tracts (39%). Households that elect not to
move when the MSR changes also provide identification of
the impact of the MSR on homeownership attainment. In
fact, in principle, nonmovers can also change their housing
tenure: renters can buy their rental property and home-
owners can sell and lease back their homes. Table 3B docu-
ments the equivalent statistics for the regression sample with
information on regulatory restrictiveness. Overall, table 3
illustrates that the variation in the subsidy arises mainly from
within-state changes in the MSR over time (affecting both
within-state movers and nonmovers) and, to a lesser extent,
time-varying across-state differences (affecting across-state
movers).
Table 4 reports the results for the baseline estimations on
the full PSID sample. Column 1 provides results for the
specification that includes only the MSR, household con-
trols, and household fixed effects. Column 2 then adds loca-
tion controls (the housing composition variables, MSA
19 The remaining terms in the user cost formula, depreciation and main-
tenance, are each typically set to a value of 0.02 (see Poterba, 1992), and
thus would be part of the constant in an estimation. For the rent data, we
compute the average self-reported rent in the PSID in the city and year in
which we observe the household. For households residing in nonmetropo-
litan areas or metropolitan areas with a relatively small sample size (fewer
than 100 PSID respondents), we compute a regional rent based on the
metropolitan areas being located in one of the nine census divisions.
20 We use 1980 census tract indicators and boundaries from the confi-
dential PSID to identify whether households moved in any particular year.
A household is identified as a mover household if a change in the tract
occurs. It is identified as an across-state mover if the state changes as
well. We cannot categorize moves that occur within the tract. While the
PSID does have variables that indicate moves, these indicators are not
consistent over the 1984 to 2007 time period. Since all within–census
tract moves are also within-state moves, table 3 may underrepresent the
share of within-state moves. It is important to emphasize that while table
3 does not capture within–census tract moves, our empirical analysis
does. We pick up every move for which there is a change in tenure status.
That is, if a household changes tenure status within tract over time, we
capture that move through a change in tenure status.
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fixed effects, and state fixed effects). Column 3 adds year
fixed effects, column 4 adds state time trends, and column 5
adds MSA time trends. Column 6 includes all of these con-
trols and allows for separate effects of the MSR by income
group. Across all six specifications, the key variable of
interest, the MSR, has no statistically significant impact on
the likelihood of homeownership, not even for the highest-
income households, in column 6, who tend to receive the
greatest tax breaks from this feature of the tax code. This
result is consistent with Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) and
suggests that, on aggregate, this very costly tax subsidy to
U.S. homeowners has no discernible impact on the likeli-
hood of homeownership attainment.
The control variables all generate results that are sensible,
intuitive, and robust across all models. Income, wealth, age,
being married, and having children all positively affect the
likelihood of homeownership, with income and being mar-
ried having particularly large impacts: based on the coeffi-
cients reported in column 5, high-income households are
13.8 percentage points more likely to own than low-income
households; being married increases the likelihood of home-
ownership by 17.1 percentage points. An episode of head or
spouse unemployment lowers the likelihood of homeowner-
ship by 4 and 3.2 percentage points, respectively. The loca-
tion controls indicate that the composition of the housing
stock matters for homeownership attainment: a greater frac-
tion of single-family units boosts homeownership attain-
ment, whereas a greater fraction of multiplexes lowers it.
Table 5 addresses the central question of this paper: To
what extent does the impact of the MID on the likelihood of
TABLE 2.—POPULATION-WEIGHTED SUMMARY STATISTICS: PSID HOUSEHOLDS, 1984–2007
Variable Observations Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Full Regression Sample
Owner-occupier—yes 53,279 0.716 0.451 0 1
Mortgage subsidy rate (absolute) 53,279 0.260 0.0284 0.187 0.405
Household income in 2007, US–$10,000 53,279 8.29 10.20 0 583.91
Household has low income ( 80% state median) 53,279 0.234 0.423 0 1
Moderate income 53,279 0.190 0.392 0 1
High income (< 120% state median) 53,279 0.576 0.494 0 1
Age of household head 53,279 45.10 13.51 0 97
Married 53,279 0.643 0.479 0 1
One child 53,279 0.176 0.380 0 1
Two children 53,279 0.173 0.379 0 1
Three or more children 53,279 0.0917 0.289 0 1
Head in labor force and unemployed last year 53,279 0.0802 0.272 0 1
Wife in labor force and unemployed last year 53,279 0.0317 0.175 0 1
Share units in tract that are single family 53,279 0.648 0.243 0 1
Share units in tract in apartment b. (5þ units) 53,279 0.155 0.191 0 1
Total net wealth in 2007, US$1 million 53,279 0.331 1.21 1.30 50.48
Year of observation 53,279 1994.3 6.88 1984 2007
Sample of Observations with MSA-Level Information on Regulatory Restrictiveness
Owner-occupier ¼ yes 29,621 0.694 0.461 0 1
Mortgage subsidy rate (absolute) 29,621 0.261 0.0293 0.194 0.405
Household income in 2007 US$10,000 29,621 9.06 11.26 0 583.91
Household has low income ( 80% state median) 29,621 0.218 0.413 0 1
Moderate income 29,621 0.170 0.376 0 1
High income (> 120% state median) 29,621 0.612 0.487 0 1
Age of household head 29,621 45.08 13.46 18 96
Married 29,621 0.621 0.485 0 1
One child 29,621 0.173 0.379 0 1
Two children 29,621 0.175 0.380 0 1
Three or more children 29,621 0.0863 0.281 0 1
Head in labor force and unemployed last year 29,621 0.0764 0.266 0 1
Wife in labor force and unemployed last year 29,621 0.0276 0.164 0 1
Share units in tract that are single family 29,621 0.617 0.279 0 1
Share units in tract in apartment b. (5þ units) 29,621 0.194 0.225 0 1
Total net wealth in 2007 US$1 million 29,621 0.353 1.27 1.30 50.48
Year of observation 29,621 1994.2 6.94 1984 2007
Regulatory index compiled by Saks (2008) 29,621 0.191 0.985 2.40 2.21
Property tax subsidy rate 29,621 0.254 0.0419 0.161 0.501
Effective mortgage interest rate 29,621 0.0836 0.0187 0.0543 0.132
House price appreciation rate (only years w/o move) 29,621 0.0363 0.0474 0.174 0.276
Av. annual rent in MSA/region in 2007 US$10,000 29,621 0.698 0.161 0.351 1.34
Additional income categories for robustness check
Household has income
Between 1.2–1.6  state median 29,621 0.159 0.366 0 1
Between 1.6–2.0  state median 29,621 0.124 0.330 0 1
Between 1.2–2.0  state median 29,621 0.284 0.451 0 1
Above 2.0  state median 29,621 0.270 0.444 0 1
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homeownership vary by location? Specifically, we report
results for specifications where the MSR is interacted with
regulatory tightness and with income status. Our proposi-
tion, theoretically motivated in section III, is that in more
regulated places (with inelastic supply), the tax subsidies
get capitalized into house values rather than expand the
(owner-occupied) housing stock and thereby have little
impact on homeownership attainment or may in fact have a
negative impact, for example, because homeownership
becomes comparably less attractive for down-payment-con-
strained households with short expected durations in their
homes. Columns 1 to 3 allow for the impact of the MSR to
vary by regulatory restrictiveness on the full sample for
which we have regulatory data, with column 2 adding state
time trends and column 3 also adding MSA time trends. Col-
umns 4 and 5 further decompose the impact of the MSR on
homeownership attainment by interacting the subsidy with
regulatory restrictiveness and with income status. Column 4
adds state time trends to the standard controls; column 5
adds MSA time trends. Columns 6 and 7 replicate the speci-
fications reported in columns 3 and 5 except that columns 6
and 7 additionally control for Household  State Fixed
Effects. The last two specifications allow us to test to what
extent our results may be driven by across-state movers who
may be quite different from the rest of the population. The
inclusion of Household  State Fixed Effects controls for
all state-specific unobserved characteristics of across-state
movers. Put differently, for each household, we exploit only
within-state variation in the MSR, ignoring any variation
that arises from across-state moves.
Columns 1 to 3 indicate that the MSR has no statistically
significant impact on the likelihood of owning if a house-
hold lives in a metropolitan area with an average degree of
regulatory restrictiveness. If a household lives in a place
with relaxed land use controls (with a regulatory index
below 0), the MSR will have a positive impact on homeow-
nership attainment, whereas the effect is negative in more
tightly constrained locations (with a regulatory index above
0), in line with our theoretical conjectures. According to
column 3, evaluating the regulatory index at its sample
mean of 0.191 suggests that the marginal effect of a 1 stan-
dard deviation increase in the MSR is negligible, increasing
the homeownership rate by 0.03 percentage points. Evaluat-
ing the regulatory index at its extreme values of 2.4
(Bloomington-Normal, Illinois) and 2.21 (New York, New
York) generates the following range: a 1 standard deviation
increase in the MSR increases the likelihood of homeow-
nership by 3.5 percentage points in the least regulated place
and reduces the same by 2.7 percentage points in the most
tightly regulated place.
Referring to columns 4 and 5, we see that a further
decomposition is insightful. It reveals that the impact of the
subsidy on homeownership attainment by regulatory status
varies considerably by income status. Our findings indicate
that the subsidy has no effect on the likelihood that low-
income households will attain homeownership, regardless
of the regulatory status of the city in which they reside. We
conjecture that this result is a combination of two stylized
facts: housing markets are segmented and very few low-
income households itemize.21 Previous research indicates
that housing markets tend to be segmented at the submetro-
politan level by house value (e.g., Case & Mayer, 1996).
Low-income households, which typically are nonitemizers,
tend to own lower-valued houses and live in housing tracts
with other lower-income households (Belsky & Duda,
2002), suggesting that for middle- or high-income house-
holds, the low-income housing tracts may not be a substi-
tute for the higher-end housing in tightly regulated markets.
TABLE 3.—SOURCES OF VARIATION IN MORTGAGE SUBSIDY RATE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Change in MSR Any Change in MSR Change in MSR >1% Change in MSR>3% Change in MSR>5%
N % N % N % N % N %
A. Full Sample (Regression Sample for Table 4)
No move across tract 305 88.9 40,712 81.6 11,336 76.7 3,317 72.7 145 39.0
Moves across tract within state 36 10.5 7,653 15.3 2,289 15.5 670 14.7 21 5.7
Across-state moves 2 0.6 1,508 3.0 1,157 7.8 576 12.6 206 55.4
Total number of observations 343 100 49,873 100 14,782 100 4,563 100 372 100
B. Sample with Information on Regulatory Restrictiveness (Table 5)
No move across tract 124 88.6 22,051 80.2 6,046 74.5 1,765 70.3 105 41.8
Moves across tract within state 14 10.0 4,597 16.7 1,401 17.3 398 15.9 17 6.8
Across-state moves 2 1.4 859 3.1 664 8.2 348 13.9 129 51.4
Total number of observations 140 100 27,507 100 8,111 100 2,511 100 251 100
We use 1980 census tract indicators to identify whether households moved in any particular year. A household is identified as a mover household if a change in the census tract occurs. It is identified as an across-
state mover if the state identifier changes as well. We cannot categorize moves that occur within tract, and hence the displayed statistics slightly underrepresent the fraction of within-state moves. The probability that
a household moves tract from one PSID period to the next is 18.3% in the full regression sample and 19.8% in the sample with information on regulatory restrictiveness. The total number of observations reported in
this table differs from the regression samples because this table considers changes in the MSR from one year to the next for all observations in the regression sample with available information. The full regression
sample consists of 53,279 observations. We do not compute changes in the MSR for the 2,342 observations in 1984, as 1983 is not in our regression sample. For a further 721 observations, no census tract information
is available for the previous year, resulting in a total of 50,216 (343 þ 49,873) observations in table 3A. The regression sample used in table 5 consists of 29,621 observations; of these 1,505 are for 1984. A further
469 observations do not have census tract information for the previous year, resulting in a total of 27,647 (140 þ 27,507) observations in table 3B.
21 Even among low-income homeowners, itemization rates are low. For
example, using 2004 data from the Survey of Finances combined with
NBER TAXSIM data, Poterba and Sinai (2008) report in their table 2 that
only 23% of low-income homeowners (those earning less than $40,000 in
2003) itemize, whereas over 98% of high-income homeowners do (those
earning $125,000 or more).
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To the extent that there is indeed no (or very little) substi-
tutability between low-income and higher-income housing
and the MSR generates little benefit for low-income home-
owners, economic theory predicts that the MSR may not
affect the demand for lower-end housing and thus will have
no effect on the price of lower-end housing, independent of
the supply price inelasticity proxied by our regulatory con-
straint measure. Taking these considerations into account,
our finding that the MSR has no effect on homeownership
attainment of low-income households appears to be quite
plausible.
The coefficients on the three-way interaction terms (In-
come status MSR  Regulatory index) for moderate- and
high-income households in columns 4 and 5 are statistically
significant and meaningful. Consider column 5, which
includes MSA time trends in addition to state time trends.
Evaluating the regulatory index at its extreme values gener-
ates the following range for moderate-income households: a
1 standard deviation increase in theMSR increases the likeli-
hood of homeownership attainment by 3.3 percentage points
in the least regulated location and reduces it by 3.3 percen-
tage points in the most tightly regulated place. For high-
income households, the impact of a 1 standard deviation
increase in the MSR on the likelihood of homeownership
ranges from a 4.7 percentage point increase (least restrictive)
to a reduction of 3.0 percentage points (most restrictive).
Columns 6 and 7 report the findings of our robustness
check whereby we include Household  State fixed effects
TABLE 4.—BASELINE SPECIFICATIONS: DO TAX SUBSIDIES INCREASE HOMEOWNERSHIP ATTAINMENT?
Dependent Variable: Household is Owner-Occupier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household
Controls Only
Add Location
Controls
Add
Year FE
Add State 
Time Trends
Add MSA 
Time Trends
MSR Varies by
Income Group
MSR 0.128 0.0453 0.223 0.0882 0.0455
(0.130) (0.112) (0.390) (0.368) (0.361)
Low income MSR 0.245
(0.382)
Moderate income MSR 0.172
(0.384)
High income MSR 0.0420
(0.380)
Moderate income 0.0781*** 0.0780*** 0.0784*** 0.0785*** 0.0772*** 0.0585
(0.00942) (0.00908) (0.00906) (0.00894) (0.00871) (0.0649)
High income 0.142*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.0631
(0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.00989) (0.0642)
Total net wealth 0.00542** 0.00446** 0.00453** 0.00486** 0.00435** 0.00443**
(0.00228) (0.00188) (0.00189) (0.00201) (0.00179) (0.00179)
Age of head 0.0347*** 0.0313*** 0.0310*** 0.0313*** 0.0305*** 0.0305***
(0.00184) (0.00174) (0.00175) (0.00175) (0.00178) (0.00178)
Age of head2 0.000254*** 0.000227*** 0.000226*** 0.000228*** 0.000219*** 0.000220***
(1.89e–05) (1.77e–05) (1.81e–05) (1.82e–05) (1.86e–05) (1.86e–05)
Married 0.196*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.171*** 0.171***
(0.0128) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0115)
One child 0.0572*** 0.0513*** 0.0518*** 0.0535*** 0.0534*** 0.0529***
(0.00786) (0.00736) (0.00731) (0.00727) (0.00711) (0.00714)
Two children 0.0973*** 0.0865*** 0.0867*** 0.0888*** 0.0901*** 0.0895***
(0.00903) (0.00857) (0.00857) (0.00855) (0.00830) (0.00833)
Three or more children 0.125*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.112***
(0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0116)
Head unemployed 0.0427*** 0.0401*** 0.0396*** 0.0400*** 0.0401*** 0.0397***
(0.00757) (0.00721) (0.00716) (0.00707) (0.00703) (0.00701)
Wife unemployed 0.0359*** 0.0349*** 0.0344*** 0.0339*** 0.0319*** 0.0318***
(0.0106) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.00996) (0.00997)
Share of units that are single family 0.0894** 0.0891** 0.0977** 0.0984** 0.0984**
(0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0417) (0.0413) (0.0413)
Share of units that are in 5þ unit buildings 0.312*** 0.311*** 0.304*** 0.308*** 0.308***
(0.0512) (0.0513) (0.0507) (0.0506) (0.0506)
Household FEs and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State  Time Trends No No No Yes Yes Yes
MSA  Time Trends No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 53,279 53,279 53,279 53,279 53,279 53,279
Number of households 4,197 4,197 4,197 4,197 4,197 4,197
Centered R2 0.221 0.288 0.288 0.294 0.315 0.315
Uncentered R2 0.221 0.288 0.288 0.294 0.315 0.315
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on households and State  Year). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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to gauge to what extent our results may be driven by
across-state movers. The coefficients of the two specifica-
tions with Household  State fixed effects are qualitatively
unchanged and quantitatively very similar to the corre-
sponding specifications without the Household  State
fixed effects, reported in the corresponding columns 3 and
5. These findings imply that our key findings are not driven
by across-state movers who may not be similar over time
and across states. Regarding all the other results from table
5, the household and location controls continue to be intui-
tive, plausible, and robust across samples and specifications
(the coefficient estimates are available from the authors on
request). Finally, as a robustness check, we reestimate the
specifications in table 5 controlling for additional compo-
nents of user cost: the NBER combined state and federal
property tax subsidy rate, the FHFA effective mortgage
rate, and the FHFA metropolitan house price appreciation
rate as well as the price of rental housing. These estimations
are reported and discussed in the online appendix and indi-
cate that the additional controls have a negligible impact on
our key findings.
D. Quantitative Effects
One way to gauge the cost of the MID is to compute the
cost per net new homeowner created by the MID. To do so,
we first determine the net number of households that are
hypothetically moved into homeownership as a result of the
TABLE 5.—RESULTS FOR SPECIFICATIONS WITH INTERACTION TAX SUBSIDY  REGULATORY RESTRICTIVENESS
Dependent Variable: Household Is Owner-Occupier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No State 
Time
Trends
With State 
Time
Trends
And With
MSA 
Time Trends
Specification 2
but 
Income Group
Specification 3
but 
Income Group
Specification 3
but with
State  HH FEs
Specification 5
but with
State  HH FEs
MSR 0.101 0.0531 0.100 0.00603
(0.515) (0.452) (0.452) (0.457)
Mortgage subsidy rate 
Regulatory index
0.329*** 0.485*** 0.457*** 0.472***
(0.127) (0.143) (0.156) (0.157)
Regulatory index 0.00572 0.0384 0.0379 0.216
(0.0711) (0.0736) (0.0874) (0.147)
Low income MSR 0.106 0.0281 0.282
(0.486) (0.485) (0.489)
Low income MSR 
Regulatory index
0.149 0.177 0.136
(0.290) (0.288) (0.294)
Low income  Regulatory index 0.114 0.118 0.0584
(0.0942) (0.103) (0.164)
Moderate income MSR 0.0720 0.0424 0.244
(0.503) (0.501) (0.510)
Moderate income MSR 
Regulatory index
0.544* 0.507* 0.527*
(0.300) (0.297) (0.303)
Moderate income 
Regulatory index
0.0564 0.0503 0.223
(0.0995) (0.106) (0.163)
High income MSR 0.195 0.237 0.192
(0.468) (0.467) (0.474)
High income MSR 
Regulatory index
0.619*** 0.589*** 0.601***
(0.164) (0.180) (0.180)
High income 
Regulatory index
0.0744 0.0712 0.238
(0.0789) (0.0936) (0.153)
Moderate income 0.0577*** 0.0563*** 0.0583*** 0.0515 0.0659 0.0569*** 0.0508
(0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0868) (0.0874) (0.0130) (0.0905)
High income 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.0631 0.0738 0.136*** 0.0171
(0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0852) (0.0861) (0.0152) (0.0902)
Total net wealth 0.00352* 0.00385* 0.00371* 0.00393* 0.00379* 0.00324 0.00333
(0.00197) (0.00202) (0.00194) (0.00205) (0.00197) (0.00220) (0.00222)
Demographics/employment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Housing composition controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FEs and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State  Time Trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA  Time Trends No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
State  Household FEs No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 29,621 29,621 29,621 29,621 29,621 29,621 29,621
Number of households 2,620 2,620 2,620 2,620 2,620 2,620 2,620
Centered R2 0.248 0.248 0.245 0.249 0.246 0.228 0.229
Uncentered R2 0.248 0.248 0.245 0.249 0.246 0.228 0.229
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on households and stateyear). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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mortgage interest subsidy. Using the specifications in tables
4 and 5, we compute the probability of homeownership for
each household with and without the mortgage subsidy. If
in a given year the subsidy moves a household from a less
than 50% likelihood of homeownership to a likelihood that
exceeds 50%, the household is counted as moving from
renting to owning. If the household’s likelihood of home-
ownership decreases from above 50% to less than 50% as a
result of the subsidy, this household is counted as moving
from owning to renting. If the household does not experi-
ence a change in the likelihood of homeownership that
crosses the 50% threshold, the household is counted as not
having experienced a change in its tenure status.
We then compute the fraction of the sample that falls into
each category: moving from renting to owning, moving
from owning to renting, or having no change in tenure sta-
tus. The net impact is computed as the percent of the sam-
ple moved into homeownership minus the percent of the
sample moved out of homeownership, as defined above, as
a result of the MID. Table 6A reports these results by speci-
fication. Notice that for the United States on average, based
on the econometric results in table 4, this exercise suggests
a net negative impact of the MID on the likelihood of
homeownership (although the effects are all not statistically
significant), whereas all but one specification reported in
table 5 imply a relatively small positive (and statistically
significant) impact. (The specification in column 6 of table
5 implies a very small but statistically significant negative
net effect.) Our core specification reported in column 5 of
table 5, which allows the impact of the MID to vary by reg-
ulatory restrictiveness and by income status, results in a net
positive gain in the number of homeowners by 3.2%, and
this is the estimate we proceed with to compute the subsidy
cost per net additional homeowner.
There are an estimated 115 million households in the
United States in 2010 (the most recent Census Bureau esti-
mate available).22 Hence, specification 5 in table 5 implies
that the subsidy in any given year generates 3.68 million
new homeowners in the United States (3.2% times 115 mil-
lion). At an estimated total cost of $104.5 billion in 2011
(Office of Management and Budget, 2010), the subsidy
per converted homeowner thus amounts to a staggering
$28,397 per year.23 The (nonsignificant) coefficients on the
MID variable reported in the various specifications in table
4, if taken at face value, all imply that the taxpayer may
spend $104.5 billion in 2011, with the overall net effect
being that fewer households own, as a consequence of the
MID.
TABLE 6.—QUANTITATIVE EFFECTS
Specification Rent? Own No Change Own? Rent Net Impact
A. Implied Overall Impact of MID on Homeownership Attainment (in Percentage Points) Using 0.5 Threshold
Table 4 (1) 0.0 97.3 2.7 2.7
Table 4 (2) 0.0 98.9 1.1 1.1
Table 4 (3) 0.0 94.9 5.1 5.1
Table 4 (4) 0.0 97.9 2.1 2.1
Table 4 (5) 0.0 98.9 1.1 1.1
Table 4 (6) 0.3 96.2 3.5 3.2
Table 5 (1) 5.0 92.2 2.8 þ2.2
Table 5 (2) 6.0 89.2 4.8 þ1.2
Table 5 (3) 6.4 89.6 4.0 þ2.4
Table 5 (4) 5.9 89.9 4.2 þ1.7
Table 5 (5) 6.6 90.0 3.4 þ3.2
Table 5 (6) 2.6 94.6 2.8 0.2
Table 5 (7) 3.4 93.9 2.7 þ0.7
B. Implied Average Change in Propensity to Own Due to Introduction of Mortgage Interest Deduction of 26% (¼ Sample Average)
Specification Income Level
Highly regulated (average regulatory index of
MSAs with index at least 1 SD above mean)
(average index: þ1.59)
Little regulated (average regulatory index of
MSAs with index at least 1 SD below mean)
(average index: 1.40)
Table 5 (4) Low Not Statistically Significant Not Statistically Significant
Moderate 24.3% þ17.9%
High 20.5% þ27.6%
Table 5 (5) Low Not Statistically Significant Not Statistically Significant
Moderate 22.0% þ17.4%
High 18.1% þ27.6%
Table 5 (7) Low Not Statistically Significant Not Statistically Significant
Moderate 28.1% þ12.9%
High 19.8% þ26.9%
Quantitative effects in italics reported in panel A are based on statistically insignificant coefficients.
22 See www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/hh-fam/table1n
.txt.
23 The costs are substantially higher according to the results reported in
column 7 of table 5, which allows the impact of the MID to vary by regu-
latory restrictiveness and income status, net of the influence of across-
state movers. This specification implies a net positive gain in the number
of homeowners of 0.7%, suggesting that to move one renter household
into homeownership through the MID costs U.S. taxpayers $129,814 in
forgone tax revenue annually.
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Table 6B documents the implied average change in the
propensity to own for low-, moderate-, and high-income
households as a consequence of the implementation of an
MID of 26%, the sample average. Results are reported sepa-
rately for tightly and loosely regulated places (corre-
sponding to the categorization in table A2). Whereas in
these polar cases, the effects of the MID on the propensity
to own are never statistically significant for low-income
households, the effects for moderate- and high-income
households are not only statistically significant but also
quantitatively meaningful. In the most tightly regulated
places, the introduction of the MID reduces the propensity
to own, depending on the specification and income category
(moderate or high), by between 18% and 28%. In the least
regulated places the propensity to own increases by
between 13% and 28%.
E. Additional Robustness Checks
In this section, we briefly describe additional robustness
checks undertaken and refer interested readers to the online
appendix for more detail. First, we consider whether the
results of our key specification are sensitive to the inclusion
of 1980 tract-level housing composition controls. We reesti-
mate our core specification, model 5 of table 5, without
these controls. Next, we examine our three-way interaction
effects by income groups more closely by reestimating our
core specification using four or even five income categories
instead of only three, both with and without housing com-
position controls. Summary statistics for the additional
income categories are reported at the bottom of table 2.
These robustness checks yield results that are consistent
with our key findings. Interestingly, the negative three-way
interaction effect between the MSR and regulatory restric-
tiveness, as reported in the online appendix, is consistently
strongest for the second-highest income group.
Finally, we compare the findings of our core analysis
with the results from an aggregate MSA-level analysis. Our
household level (core) analysis allows us to carefully iden-
tify the effect of the MSR on individual tenure decisions,
depending on income status and supply conditions and con-
trolling for numerous time-invariant and time-varying char-
acteristics. We two-way-cluster on households and State 
Year in the household-level analysis, accounting for house-
hold correlations. An MSA-level analysis allows for an
alternative manner to account for household (within MSA)
correlations and provides a useful robustness check. More-
over, our key variable of interest, the MID, varies at the
MSA level; thus, it is sensible to consider a specification
that aggregates the other variables to the MSA level. We
therefore use our household data to aggregate up, for each
PSID year, to the MSA level, dropping MSAs that cross
state borders. Summary statistics of the resulting MSA-
level panel and model estimates are reported in the online
appendix. Overall, the results are comparable to those of
our core analysis: the MID has a positive effect on the pro-
portion of homeowners in elastically supplied markets and
a negative effect in inelastically supplied markets.
VI. Conclusion
This paper provides a first look at the impact of the com-
bined state and federal mortgage interest tax subsidy on
homeownership attainment, taking into account housing
supply conditions via a measure of regulatory restrictive-
ness in local housing markets. We find that the MID has no
statistically significant impact on homeownership attain-
ment in aggregate. However, the MID does have an impact
on individual homeownership decisions—both positive and
negative—depending on the restrictiveness of land use reg-
ulations at the place of residence and the income status of
the household. In places with more elastic housing supply,
the MID has a positive effect on homeownership attain-
ment, but only for higher-income groups. In more restric-
tive places, the mortgage tax subsidy has a significant
adverse impact, again only for higher-income groups. The
MID has no impact on the homeownership attainment of
low-income households regardless of regulatory status. We
speculate that this is because the housing market within a
city tends to be segmented by income and the MID provides
a tax subsidy only to the relatively higher-income house-
holds that itemize. Consequently, we expect that lower-
income housing will generally not experience house price
changes due to changes in the subsidy.
One argument in favor of the MID is that it increases
homeownership attainment and as a result creates positive
externalities. Recent research has highlighted that the posi-
tive externalities associated with homeownership may help
improve local communities confronted with underperform-
ing public schools, lack of social capital, and poor govern-
ance (Hoff & Sen, 2005; DiPasquale & Glaeser, 1999; Hil-
ber & Mayer, 2009; Fischel, 2001). However, these positive
externalities are likely confined to—typically highly urba-
nized—places with inelastic housing supply, wherein civic
engagement and investments into local public goods are
capitalized into local house prices. Our research suggests
that the MID decreases rather than increases homeowner-
ship attainment in these places. In places with lax land use
controls, the MID has a positive impact on homeownership
attainment, yet in these elastically supplied—typically less
urbanized—places, homeownership may generate few or no
positive externalities (Hilber & Mayer, 2009; Hilber, 2010).
Thus, a central implication of our paper is that there is a dis-
connect between the places in which positive externalities
of homeownership exist and the places in which the MID is
able to generate increases in homeownership. We conclude
that the MID is a costly and ineffective policy for boosting
homeownership and social welfare.
To fully understand the efficiency (and distributional)
impacts of the MID, future work might examine its impact
on the ‘‘overconsumption’’ of owner-occupied housing by
income and regulatory status. This paper examines only a
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portion of the total subsidy to homeowners. We did not
examine the effect of other subsidies to homeowners:
imputed rent is untaxed, capital gains are untaxed for most
households, and property taxes are tax deductible. Another
area for future research is to explore the extent to which
these other tax subsidies to homeowners also generate unin-
tended consequences, particularly in more inelastically sup-
plied housing markets.
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